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Abstract  
From the 1950s and onwards, the relationship between democracy 
and economic development remains a matter of curiosity. In this study, 
the relationship between democracy and economic development as 
institutional determinants of military expenditures is investigated by 
Dumitreschu-Hurlin (2012) time-varying panel causality test for 34 
OECD countries for the period of 1990-2017. As a result of the analysis, 
between 1995-2015 period there was a two-way causal relationship 
between military expenditures and economic development, military 
expenditures and democracy, and a one-way causality running from 
development to democracy. In the period between 2002 and 2016, there 
was a one-way causal relationship from democracy to military spending 
and from democracy to development. In the period of 2003-2017, it was 
revealed that there was a one way causality from democracy to 
development and the compatibility perspective is valid.              
Keywords: Military Expenditures, Democracy, Development, 
Time-Varying Panel Causality 
JEL Classification Codes: H10, O47, 043, B25     
 
Introduction  
Lipset (1959) states that “the more wealthy a nation, the greater the 
chances of maintaining democracy” and democracy will take place after 
a certain economic development in 1959, which has made serious 
repercussions by expressing the impact of economic development on 
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democracy (Cevizli, 2013: 1). Democracy, by definition, has the right to 
speak of the people in the administration as well as the rights and 
freedoms of individuals takes into account (Beşkaya and Manan, 2008: 
3).   
Democracy, income distribution, government policies, 
macroeconomic stability, institutional factors and so on. notion (Arslan 
and Doğan, 2004: 1) and the corporate approach to the development 
concept defined by various expressions (Acemoglu et al., 2004). In terms 
of cultural approach, the geographical features of the countries are 
explained with the differences of belief, honor and social structure. On 
the other hand, the concept of development in terms of institutional 
approach is explained by the institutional differences of the countries in 
terms of infrastructure (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Erkuş and 
Karamelikli, 2016). As Huntington puts it, although the concept of 
democracy is not necessary for economic development (Erkuş and 
Karamelikli, 2016), Huntington (2006) states that, the weak and fragility 
of political institutions in developing countries is high. He states that the 
relationship between economic development and democracy is 
consecutive and, if expressed in a sequence, the priority is economic 
development and that democracy occurs later (Koçak and Uzay, 2017: 
708). Sen (1999: 3) states that the increase of the GNP or per capita 
income is important for the expansion of the freedoms of the individuals 
constituent the society, and that the freedoms depend on social and 
economic arrangements such as education and health services and 
political and civil rights such as freedom of participation in public debate 
of democracy. In other words, the concept of development is also 
expressed by political freedoms as well as institutional freedoms (Attar, 
2006: 42, 43).                                
The relationship between economic growth and democracy is 
explained by three basic approaches (Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990: 4, 5). 
According to Huntington and a group of researchers, the conflict 
approach, which argues that democracy negatively affects economic 
growth, states that democracy and economic growth cannot occur 
simultaneously. It is stated that after economic growth, growth will 
contribute to democratization (Barış and Erdoğmuş, 2018: 89, 90). 
According to the compassion approach proposed by Olson (1996), where 
democracy is positively affecting economic growth, democratic 
processes are explained with the view that economic growth is 
complementary and supportive (Şahin, 2017: 47; Acaravcı et al. 2015: 
120). Lipset (1959) argues that the level of growth in the relationship 
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between democracy and economic development has a positive effect on 
the sustainability of democracy. The prerequisite and encouraging 
component of democracy are welfare, urbanization, industrialization, 
education and so on. socio-economic factors (Aleksanyan, 2013: 4), the 
channels that affect the growth of democracy, political instability, 
governance quality, public sector size, human capital level, income 
inequality, trade openness and physical capital level (Tavares and 
Wacziarg, 2001: 45). According to this approach, it is stated that 
democracy can increase growth by reducing inequality in income 
distribution by balancing human capital accumulation, as well as 
preventing growth by decreasing physical capital accumulation and 
increasing public expenditures (Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001: 1343; 
Doğan, 2005: 10). Skeptical approach asserts that it is not very strong 
relation between two variables (Arslan and Doğan, 2004: 2; Acaravcı et 
al., 2015: 120).                                            
Another reason why democracies can be expected to have lower 
military expenditures is that they are less likely to go to war. The 
Democratic Peace Theory, dating back to the philosopher Immanuel Kant 
(1795), argues that democracies do not go to war with other democracies 
(Doyle, 1986; Russet 1993; Brauner, 2014: 2). Immanuel Kant (1975) 
argues that the spread of democracy reduces the likelihood of wars to 
continue and provides an incentive to reduce military spending (Kant, 
[1795] 1917; Rota, 2015: 2). In general, it is believed that democratic 
states are more peaceful and less likely to be involved in international 
conflicts. Solberg and Wolfson (1999), James et al. (1999), Oneal and 
Russet (1997), starting from this point of view, the increase in the level 
of democracy in a country that can be expected to decline in defense 
spending (Lebovic, 2001; Yıldırım and Sezgin, 2002: 3). In autocratic 
societies, with the concern of maintaining their power to support a small 
elite group, human capital is given importance in order to be re-elected in 
democratic societies. Democratization positively affects education, health 
expenditures and public expenditures in general, while it negatively 
affects military expenditures (Riedel and Sommerstein, 2013: 2).        
The level of military spending may be higher in unlawful forms of 
dictator administration. A strong army can reduce the possibility of 
military revolt, as well as strengthen the possibility of organizing military 
coups. Therefore, in order to ensure the adherence of the army, dictatorial 
forms of governance must give the army more privileges (Brauner, 2014: 
3). Given that the political importance of military power is more than 
democracy in the form of dictatorial administration, the transition to 
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power in dictatorships cannot be ensured by a formal mechanism and 
violence comes to the forefront for the protection of power. Therefore, 
military expenditures tend to be high. Empirically, Dunne et al. (2008), 
Albalate et al. (2012) and Töngür et al. (2015) support a strong negative 
relationship between the democracy index and military spending (Kotera 
and Okada, 2015: 4).                             
Harrison and Wolf (2012) state that democratic forms of 
government are less likely to carry out war and military spending, and 
that government spending must be further constrained. Also stated that 
democracy improves the state's ability to increase public spending in the 
event of war. According to Firdmuc, democracy promotes economic 
freedoms. Economic freedoms are defined as the situation where 
individuals can perform freely without any obstacles when performing 
their economic activities (Beskaya and Manan, 2009: 48). Because the 
contribution of economic freedoms to growth is positive, the contribution 
of democracy to economic growth is positive (Firdmuc, 2003: 596; 
Doğan, 2005: 15).                  
Contributions of the study to the literature, as stated firstly by 
Aleksanyan (2013: 21), the economic freedom index, which measures 
democracy, consists of ten economic indicators such as freedom of 
employment, commercial freedom, monetary freedom, state expenditures 
and financial freedom, property rights, investment and financial freedom. 
It is shown that the average of freedom indices can be used as the index 
of democracy. Inspired by the study, the average of these ten economic 
measures as a democracy index was taken as a variable. Secondly, the 
time-varying panel causality test developed by Dumitreschu-Hurlin 
(2012), which has not been previously applied in this regard, is used as 
econometric analysis in this study. Thirdly, the relationship between 
democracy, military spending and economic development for the 1990-
2017 period and OECD countries has not been discussed before and it 
aims to contribute to the literature in terms of the time period is 
examined.                             
Literature Review 
Many studies on the relationship between democracy and military 
expenditures are available in the literature. Leblang (1997) examined the 
impact of democracy on economic growth for the 1960-1989 period for 
70 countries and concluded that the impact of democracy on economic 
growth is positive (the approximation approach) by reducing the income 
inequality of democracy and increasing human capital accumulation. 
Barro (1999) examined the relationship between economic growth and 
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democracy in 100 countries for 1960-1995 period with the LSQ method. 
It is concluded that it affects the growth negatively (current conflict 
approach). Ken Farr et al. (1998) examined the 20 industrialized and 78 
industrializing countries by using panel granger causality analysis for the 
period 1975-1995 and concluded that there was a one-way causality 
relationship from economic welfare to democracy in both groups. 
Narayan and Smith (2006), 1972-1999 period for China, by using ARDL, 
VEC and causality tests, and variance decomposition analysis has been 
discussed, democracy in the short and long term growth negatively 
(conflict approach is valid) is concluded. Jaunky (2013) examined the 
1980-2005 period for 28 Sub-Saharan African countries and concluded 
that there is a bi-directional causal relationship between democracy and 
economic growth. Acemoglu et al. (2014) examined the period of 1960-
2010 with the GMM method for 175 countries and concluded that the 
adaptation approach was valid. Rota (2011), evaluates the relationship 
between military expenditures and political regime/democracy within the 
framework of the 'peace dividend', in which public revenues increased as 
a result of the decrease in defense expenditures will be used in different 
areas other than defense, while Alesina and Spoalore (2005, 2006). It 
proposes a model where the concept of peace dividend is not as effective 
as expected and emphasizes that increased democracy will result in the 
emergence of more nations and increase the possibility of regional 
conflict. Hess and Orphanides (2001) argue that democratization does not 
produce a “peace dividend” and that wars can also occur in 
administrations with a democratic regime (Tongur et al., 2013: 4). 
Fordam and Walker (2005) argue that, in the context of Immanuel Kant's 
liberal views, the decrease in military spending will increase the wealth 
and prosperity of the countries. Brauner (2014) examined whether the 
democratic countries for the 1960-2000 period allocated less resources to 
military spending than the dictatorship-led countries. They argue that 
democratic administrations allocate less and less resources to military 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP, and that the causality relationship 
is one-way from the regime form to military expenditures. In the 
literature discussed to investigate the relationship between democracy 
and military spending and for Turkey does not have a lot of work 
received. Beşkaya and Menan (2009) examined for the 1970-2005 period 
for Turkey, democracy showed the uncertainty of economic growth 
relationship, the relationship between economic growth with economic 
freedom is positive but not reached a clear conclusion for the impact on 
the economic growth of democracy. Erkuş and Karamelikli the (2016) 
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examined the 1950-2010 period, the ARDL test for Turkey and has 
reached the conclusion that the income level of democracy is negatively 
affected. Demirkan ve Kaya (2012), 1980-2006 period for Turkey 
analyzed with Johansen- Juselius (1990) cointegration and Granger 
causality tests, It is concluded that there is a cointegration relationship 
between democracy and economic growth and that there is a one-way 
causality (coherence approach) from democracy to economic growth. 
Koçak and Uzay (2017), for the 1975-2014 period, in their study dealt 
with the Johansen (1988, 1991) and Maki (2012) tests for Turkey, It is 
stated that fertility rates in democratic societies will be low, education 
and investment expenditures will be higher and in this case, it will affect 
economic growth positively.                                     
Econometric Application: Data set                                    
In this study, an econometric analysis is conducted3 using Milex 
(Military Expenditure of% GDP), HDI (Human Development Index) and 
Democ (Democracy Index) variables for 34 OECD countries between 
1995 and 2017, excluding Iceland and Korea. Heritage Foundation and 
the Wall Street Journal, which consist of 10 economic measures of 
freedom; commercial freedom, monetary freedom, government spending 
and financial freedom, property rights, investment and financial freedom, 
labor freedom and so on. By scoring the average freedom score using a 
scale between 0 and 100, where various factors are weighted equally, 
economic freedom index and property rights are generally expressed and 
accepted as one of the indicators used to measure democracy 
(Aleksanyan, 2013: 21)4. In this study, Gauss 14.0 and Eviews 10.0 
programs were analyzed.          
Equation (1) expresses the effect of the index of democracy and 
human development on military expenditures.           
Milexi,t = B0 + B1.HDIi,t + B2.Democi,t + ui,t                         (1) 
The term B0 in the model refers to the fixed term and B1 refers to 
the slope coefficient of HDI. B2 indicates the slope coefficient of Democ. 
ui,t is the error term of model (1). In both models, i (i = 1,2, ..., N) is the 
cross-sectional data dimension and t (t = 1, 2, ..., T) is the time series 
dimension. In this study, i = 1,2, ..., ... n and t = 1995, 1996, ..., 2017.      
 
 
3Democracy index data was obtained from heritage.org – Index of Economic Freedom 
(https://www.heritage.org/index/visualize). 
4 Milex data was compiled from “Word Development Index Based on World Bank Data” and 
HDI data was compiled from “UNDP-Human Development Reports” databases.    
 International Journal of Contemporary Economics and  
Administrative Sciences 
ISSN: 1925 – 4423  
Volume: 9, Issue: 2, Year: 2019, pp. 405-427 
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo. 
411 
 
Methodology 
In this study, the causal relationship between military (defense) 
expenditures, economic development and democracy in OECD member 
countries is investigated with a time-varying panel causality analysis, 
which allows the examination of the causal relationship. In the first stage, 
whether the variables have horizontal cross-sectional dependence is 
found in Breusch-Pagan, CDlm (Pesaran 2004), CD (Pesaran 2004), 
Pesaran et al. (2008) tests. In the second stage, stationary levels of the 
variables were determined with the help of panel unit root test developed 
by CADF test. In the third stage, the cross-sectional dependence for the 
models and homogeneity for the models were examined with the help of 
delta test. And fourth and last stage, the results of the causal relationship 
between the variables and the periods were determined with the help of 
the figures.                
Cross-section dependence is an important factor in determining the 
techniques to be used in panel data analysis. Recently, most of the 
analyzes that we can express recently take into account the state of 
horizontal cross-sectional dependence analysis - II. generation analysis. 
Horizontal section dependence indicates the existence of correlation 
between error terms calculated for each section (Tatoglu, 2013: 9; Gul 
and Inal, 2017: 75). It can also be stated that a shock coming to one of 
the cross-sectional units affects the other cross-sectional units.                             
Horizontal cross-sectional dependence Breusch and Pagan (1980), 
CDlm (Pesaran 2004), CD (Pesaran 2004), Pesaran et al. (2008) tests. In 
this study, the presence of horizontal cross-sectional dependence was 
investigated with the help of four tests. When the results of the cross-
sectional dependence analysis were examined, the H0 hypothesis, which 
asserts that the variables do not include the cross-sectional dependence 
for all variables except the milex variable, was rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis was accepted in CD Pesaran (2004) analysis. In 
this context, it is necessary to use second generation unit root analyzes 
which take the assumption of horizontal cross-section dependence into 
account for the stability of the variables.    
In the study, Pesaran (2007) CADF panel root analysis was used which 
takes into account the stationarity and horizontal cross-sectional 
dependence of the variables. The CADF test calculates both the test 
statistic value for each section and the test statistic for the overall panel. 
If the calculated test statistic is higher than the critical values of Pesaran 
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(2007), Ho hypothesis is rejected and the variable is considered to be 
stationary. 
Table 1: Horizontal Section Dependency Test for Variables 
Model Breusch & 
Pagan 1980 
CDlm (Pesaran 
2004) 
CD   
(Pesaran 
2004) 
Peseran 
vd.(2008) 
HDİ 708,099 
(0,000)*** 
4,392 
(0,000)*** 
-1,891 
(0,029)** 
4,273 (0,000)*** 
Milex 725,834 
(0,000)*** 
4,921(0,000)*** -0,291 
(0,386) 
10,203(0,000)*** 
Democracy 839,970 
(0,000)*** 
8,328 
(0,000)*** 
-2,569 
(0,005)***  
3,745 (0,000)*** 
Note: *** indicates that horizontal cross-sectional dependence is accepted at the 
significance level of 1% and 5%, respectively. 
 
In this context, when Table 1 is examined, the test statistic for the 
overall panel is -1,872, and since this value is smaller than the critical 
values calculated for Pesaran (2007) panel statistic, HDI variable was 
found to be non-stationary. When the HDI variable is examined on a 
cross-sectional basis, it is found that the unit is rootless only for Canada, 
Luxembourg, Czech Republic and England. When the first difference of 
HDI variable was taken, the test statistic was found to be greater than the 
critical value, ie the unit became rootless when the HDI difference was 
taken. 
The Milex variable, like the HDI variable, has become stationary in 
the first difference case while the unit value is not rooted, ie, stationary. 
When the Milex variable is examined for cross-sectional level values, 
only the Netherlands and Portugal are stationary. 
Because the test statistic calculated for the democracy variable was 
-2,222, the critical value calculated for Pesaran (2007) panel at 10% 
significance level was greater than (-2,21), it was found that this variable 
was unit rootless, ie stationary. When this variable level value is 
examined in cross-sectional dimension; In Austria, England, Estonia, the 
Netherlands, Italy, Hungary and New Zealand, the unit was found to be 
unit rootless.                              
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Table 2: CADF Panel Unit Root Test 
 I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
 HDİ D(HDI) Milex D(Milex) Democracy   
 
D( Democracy) 
Country lags CADF-
stat      
   
lags 
CADF-
stat      
lags CADF-
stat      
lags CADF-
stat      
lags CADF-
stat      
lags CADF-
stat      
ABD 1,000 -2,101 1,00
0 
-2,102 1,00 -0,584 1,00 - 2,472 1,00
0 
0,132 1,00
0 
-2,747 
Almanya 1,000 -0,656 1,00
0 
-3,461b 1,00
0 
-1,527 1,00
0 
-1,971 1,00
0 
-2,511 1,00
0 
-2,867 
Avusturya 1,000 -1,640 2,00
0 
-1,199 1,00
0 
-1,595 1,00
0 
-3,593b 1,00
0 
-3,272c 3,00
0 
-1,735 
Avusturalya 3,000 -1,013 1,00
0 
-3,021c 1,00
0 
-1,685 1,00
0 
-2,070 1,00
0 
-1,918 1,00
0 
-1,962 
Belçika 1,000 -2,544 1,00
0 
-3,667 3,00
0 
-2,126 3,00
0 
-1,893 1,00
0 
-2,954 1,00
0 
-4,648a 
Çek Cum. 1,000 -6,129a 1,00
0 
-6,010a 1,00
0 
-1,720 3,00
0 
-2,191 1,00
0 
-2,087 1,00
0 
-4,700a 
Danimarka 1,000 -1,720 1,00
0 
-3,202c 1,00
0 
-2,445 1,00
0 
-4,916a 1,00
0 
-2,119 1,00
0 
-2,023 
Estonya 2,000 -0,186 2,00
0 
-4,658a 2,00
0 
-1,109 1,00
0 
-3,535b 1,00
0 
-1,548 3,00
0 
-1,249 
Finlandya 1,000 -1,455 1,00
0 
-4,251 1,00
0 
-1,264 1,00
0 
-2,667 1,00
0 
-3,094c 1,00
0 
-2,922 
Fransa 1,000 -2,249 1,00
0 
-3,374b 1,00
0 
-0,780 1,00
0 
-1,266 1,00
0 
-1,553 1,00
0 
-5,048a 
Hollanda 1,000 -2,194 1,00
0 
-2,880 1,00
0 
-3,732b 1,00
0 
-2,707 1,00
0 
-2,754 1,00
0 
-2,266 
İngiltere 1,000 -4,338a 1,00
0 
-6,676a 1,00
0 
-1,797 1,00
0 
-2,036 1,00
0 
-3,374b 3,00
0 
-3,125c 
İrlanda 1,000 -2,640 1,00
0 
-2,359 1,00
0 
-2,801 1,00
0 
-2,190 3,00
0 
-1,914 2,00
0 
-1,628 
İspanya 1,000 -0,878 1,00
0 
-3,773b 1,00
0 
-1,821 1,00
0 
-3,826b 3,00
0 
-1,531 3,00
0 
-1,969 
İsrail 1,000 -2,110 1,00
0 
-3,576b 1,00
0 
-2,889 1,00
0 
-1,995 1,00
0 
-2,707 2,00
0 
-1,412 
İsveç 1,000 -1,645 1,00
0 
-2,153 3,00
0 
-0,807 3,00
0 
-0,790 1,00
0 
-1,206 1,00
0 
-3,888b 
İsviçre 3,000 -2,064 3,00
0 
-2,562 1,00
0 
-0,799 1,00
0 
-2,889 1,00
0 
-1,136 1,00
0 
-3,034c 
İtalya 2,000 0,469 1,00
0 
-3,242c 1,00
0 
-2,876 1,00
0 
-2,608 1,00
0 
-2,311 1,00
0 
-2,801 
Japonya 1,000 -2,222 1,00
0 
-3,529b 1,00
0 
-1,109 1,00
0 
-1,340 3,00
0 
-5,723a 3,00
0 
-4,644a 
Kanada 1,000 -3,268c 1,00
0 
-2,175 1,00
0 
-1,895 1,00
0 
-3,089c 2,00
0 
-2,073 2,00
0 
-2,429 
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Letonya 2,000 -1,185 2,00
0 
-3,333c 1,00
0 
-1,833 1,00
0 
-0,988 2,00
0 
-1,435 1,00
0 
-2,925 
Litvanya 2,000 -1,550 1,00
0 
-3,306c 1,00
0 
-2,401 1,00
0 
-1,946 2,00
0 
-0,535 1,00
0 
-2,751 
Lüksemburg 1,000 -3,027c 3,00
0 
-1,902 1,00
0 
-1,316 1,00
0 
-3,759b 1,00
0 
-2,798 1,00
0 
-2,656 
Macaristan 1,000 -0,787 1,00
0 
-3,303c 1,00
0 
-2,002 1,00
0 
-2,343 3,00
0 
-2,671 1,00
0 
-2,785 
Meksika 1,000 -2,666 1,00
0 
-5,110a 1,00
0 
-2,179 1,00
0 
-2,124 1,00
0 
-4,001b 1,00
0 
-4,634a 
Norveç 2,000 -2,709 1,00
0 
-2,921 1,00
0 
-1,292 1,00
0 
-3,688b 3,00
0 
-2,389 3,00
0 
-1,288 
Polonya 1,000 -1,550 1,00
0 
-2,591 1,00
0 
-1,976 1,00
0 
-3,422b 1,00
0 
-2,843 1,00
0 
-2,501 
Portekiz 1,000 -1,011 1,00
0 
-3,047c 1,00
0 
-2,285 2,00
0 
-3,308b 3,00
0 
-1,054 1,00
0 
-3,553b 
Slovakya 1,000 -2,287 1,00
0 
-1,196 1,00
0 
-6,208a 1,00
0 
-3,061c 1,00
0 
-2,805 1,00
0 
-3,251b 
Şili 1,000 -1,218 1,00
0 
-5,561a 3,00
0 
-2,459 3,00
0 
-2,135 1,00
0 
-0,635 1,00
0 
-1,717 
Türkiye 1,000 -1,318 1,00
0 
-2,885 1,00
0 
-0,961 1,00
0 
-4,131a 3,00
0 
-1,135 1,00
0 
-3,642b 
Yeni Zelnda 1,000 -1,418 1,00
0 
-2,789 1,00
0 
-1,420 1,00
0 
-1,982 1,00
0 
-2,846 1,00
0 
-3,551b 
Yunanistan 1,000 -1,319 1,00
0 
-2,529 1,00
0 
-2,468 1,00
0 
-2,973c 2,00
0 
-3,428b 1,00
0 
-1,510 
Slovenya 1,000 -1,028 1,00
0 
-3,207c 1,00
0 
-0,809 1,00
0 
-2,897 1,00
0 
-1,335 1,00
0 
-1,958 
Panel Kritik 
Değer -1,872 3,281
a -1,911 -2,612a -2,222c -2,818a 
Note: CADF statistic critical values, constant model -4.11 (1%), -3.36 (5%) and -2.97 (10%) (Pesaran 2007, 
Table I (b), p: 275), Panel statistics critical values, -2.57 (1%), -2.33 (5%) and -2.21 (10%) in fixed model 
(Pesaran 2007, table II (b), p: 280). a, b and c are 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.                
            
Horizontal cross-section dependence and homogeneity of the 
models are important for choosing the right model. In this context, if the 
models include horizontal cross-sectional dependence, it is important to 
use second generation analyzes that take this into account in order to 
obtain more reliable results. On the other hand, homogeneity and 
heterogeneity is one of the issues that should be considered in model 
selection. When Table 3 is examined, Ho hypothesis that does not 
include horizontal cross-section dependence for all models was rejected 
and alternative hypothesis could not be rejected. For the homogeneity 
test, Ho hypothesis that the models are homogeneous was rejected and 
the models were assumed to show heterogeneity.  
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Table 3: Horizontal Section Dependency Test for Models 
Model Breusch & Pagan (1980) 
CDlm 
(Pesaran 
2004) 
CD 
(Pesaran 
2004) 
Peseran vd. 
(2008) 
HDI - Milex 2859,985 
(0,000)*** 
68,634 
(0,000)*** 
39,253 
(0,000)*** 
134,038 
(0,000)*** 
Milex - HDI 1867,091 
(0,000)*** 
38,992 
(0,000)*** 
4,513 
(0,000)*** 
133,306 
(0,000)*** 
Democracy - 
Milex 
1862,185 
(0,000)*** 
38,846 
(0,000)*** 
16,403 
(0,000)*** 
116,049 
(0,000)*** 
Milex - 
Democracy 
2122,410 
(0,000)*** 
46,614 
(0,000)*** 
16,255 
(0,000)*** 
115,923 
(0,000)*** 
Democracy - 
HDI 
1992,240 
(0,000)*** 
42,728 
(0,000)*** 
6,428 
(0,000)*** 
55,568 
(0,000)*** 
HDI - 
Democracy 
4019,586 
(0,000)*** 
103,253 
(0,000)*** 
57,178 
(0,000)*** 
55,618 
(0,000)*** 
Note: *** For horizontal cross-section dependence, it is accepted that horizontal cross-
section dependence is accepted at 1% significance level and homogeneity is rejected at 
1% significance level for homogeneity test.               
            
Homogeneity Test                   
The homogeneity or heterogeneity of coefficients in panel data 
studies is an important factor in determining cointegration and causality 
analyzes. Homogeneity in all countries/regions and so on. It indicates 
that the slope coefficients calculated for units such as βi are equal to β, 
which is a single slope coefficient, whereas in heterogeneity, at least one 
of the units βi aits is different. Pesaran and Yamagata (2008) are 
homogeneity ∆�  ve ∆adȷ�   statistics. In this study, this test was analyzed 
and the results are presented in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Delta (Homogeneity) Test Results for Models 
Model            Delta_tilde Delta_tilde_adj 
HDI - Milex       29,824*** 31,983*** 
Milex - HDI 30,923*** 33,162*** 
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Democracy - 
Milex 
12,549*** 13,458*** 
Milex - 
Democracy 
15,331*** 16,441*** 
Democracy - HDI 19,064*** 20,444*** 
HDI - Democracy 15,757*** 16,898*** 
 Note: ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Time-varying Panel Causality Test         
According to the time-varying panel causality analysis developed 
by Dimitreschu and Hurlin (2012), it should be strong against horizontal 
cross-sectional dependence and βi’s should be different and their 
coefficients should be heterogeneous for each country. For this reason, 
homogeneity tests are applied to the models to be established first. 
Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012), whose basics were developed by Granger 
(1969), are panel data forms of a time-varying causality test. 
           𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ∝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ ∑ 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌(𝑘𝑘)𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌, 𝑡𝑡 − 𝑘𝑘+ ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑌𝑌(𝑘𝑘)𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 xi,t−k + ℰ𝑌𝑌, 𝑡𝑡          (2) 
It is shown as (Dumitrescu and Hurlin, 2012: 1451; Gül and Inal, 2017: 
76). (2) Y represents the HDI in model 1, MILEX in model 2, 
DEMOCRACY in model 3, and k represents the lag length. The delay 
coefficients of the Y dependent variables β represent the latency 
coefficients of the independent variables and these variables should also be 
stationary (Gül and Inal, 2017: 75-77; Öncel et al. 2017: 411).       H0: βi = 0,∀i= 1, … . , N  (There is causality for all units)  H1: βi = 0,∀i= 1, … . , N1 (There is no causality for all units)     
βi ≠ 0,∀i= N1 + 1, N1 + 2, … . , N 
Dumitreschu and Hurlin (2012) developed Wald (𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁,𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) ve  𝑍𝑍𝑁𝑁,𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 
statistics to test these hypotheses. Statistics are calculated as follows 
(Dumitreschu and Hurlin, 2012: 1453, 1454; Gül and Inal, 2017: 76; 
Oncel et al. 2017: 411): 
𝑾𝑾𝑵𝑵,𝑻𝑻𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯 = 𝟏𝟏 𝑵𝑵⁄ ∑ 𝑾𝑾𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏 𝒊𝒊,𝑻𝑻,          
  ZNHnc =                           √N � 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁,𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻− 𝑁𝑁−1 ∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 �𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇��                 �𝑁𝑁−1 ∑ 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1      𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁,𝑇𝑇 ⟶∞  N(0,1).         
If the calculated test statistics are greater than the critical values or the 
probability values of the test statistics are less than 5-10% significance 
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level, the null hypothesis is rejected and “there is causality for some units 
kabul. Arslantürk et al. (2011) and Gul and Inal, 2017: 76, 77), there may 
not be a causal relationship between the variables discussed for each 
period under investigation. While there is a causality relationship in one 
period period examined, a causality relationship may not exist in another 
period period. For this reason, it is stated that the period period examined 
is divided into sub-periods and causality analyzes are performed. For this 
study, the number of windows was taken as 15 and Dumitrezchu-Hurlin 
(2012) causality analysis was applied and graphs were drawn according 
to the significance level of 10% and it was seen that there was a causality 
relationship in periods below 10%. 1990-2004, 1991-2005, 1992-2006, 
1993-2007, 1994-2008, 1995-2009, 1996-2010, 1997-2011, 1998-2012, 
1999-2013, 2000-2014, 2001-2015, 2002- 2016 is rounded up to 2003-
2017 and each period progresses by one year compared to the previous 
period. Because of this method applied, this analysis is called as time-
varying causality test. An important feature of the time-varying panel 
causality test is that it allows to examine the causality relationship as sub-
periods rather than expressing the period in question as a single period 
interval and to test the stability in the analysis. 
Table 5: Time-varying Causality Analysis Result 
Model HDI - MILEX MILEX - HDI DEMOC - MILEX MILEX - DEMOC DEMOC - HDI HDI -DEMOC 
Year Prob Prob Prob Prob Prob Prob 
1995-2009 0,000*** 0,019** 0,0927* 0,0004*** 0,229 0,000*** 
1996-2010 0,090* 0,021** 0,0316** 0,0069*** 0,011 0,067* 
1997-2011 0,0001*** 0,484 0,006*** 0,000*** 0,685 0,081* 
1998-2012 0,000*** 0,099* 0,015** 0,000*** 0,679 0,006*** 
1999-2013 0,000*** 0,044** 0,005*** 0,002*** 0,585 0,002*** 
2000-2014 0,000*** 0,005*** 0,012** 0,000*** 0,722 0,000*** 
2001-2015 0,000*** 0,016** 0,012** 0,010* 0,491 0,000*** 
2002-2016 0,747 0,2672 0,019** 0,486 0,034** 0,462 
2003-2017 0,644 0,8737 0,966 0,933 0,466 0,097* 
Note: ***, **, * express the significance of causality at 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels, respectively. 
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In Figure 1, when the changing causal relationship between 
military expenditures and development is examined; Between 1995-
2009, 1996-2010, 1997-2011, 1998-2012, 1999-2013, 2000-2014, 2001-
2015, a two-way causality was determined, while the causality 
relationship between development and military expenditures in 2002-
2016 and 2003-2017 has disappeared.            
 
Figure 1: Time-varying Causality Relationship Between Military Expenditures 
and Development 
Note: While the areas below the critical value have causality, the areas above the critical value 
have disappeared. 
                                          
In Figure 2, when the changing causality relationship between military 
expenditures and democracy is examined, there is a two-way causality between 
1995-2009, 1996-2010, 1997-2011, 1998-2012, 1999-2013, 2000-2014, 2001-
2015 periods. In 2016 period, it was determined that there was only one-way 
causality from democracy to military expenditures, but the causality 
relationship disappeared in 2003-2017 period.     
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Figure 2: Time-varying Causality Relationship Between Military Expenditures 
and Democracy 
  Note: While the areas below the critical value have causality, the areas above 
the critical value have   disappeared.      
 
When the relationship between development and democracy is examined 
in Figure 3, there is a one-way causality from development to democracy 
in 1995-2009, 1996-2010, 1997-2011, 1998-2012, 1999-2013, 2000-
2014, 2001-2015 periods. and a one-way relationship from democracy to 
development has been determined. In the 2003-2017 period, a one-way 
causality from democracy to development was identified. In other words, 
it can be concluded that the compability approach is valid for these 
periods.                
Figure 3: Time-varying Causality Relationship between Development and 
Democracy 
 Note: While the areas below the critical value have causality, the areas above the critical value 
have disappeared. 
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Results 
In this study, it is aimed to contribute to the literature in the 
framework of the relationship between democracy and economic 
development which is one of the main indicators of the institutional 
structure and determinants of military expenditures between 1995 and 
2017 in 34 OECD countries. The foundations of economic development 
have been tried to be explained by economic factors for many years. 
However, as well as economic factors, there are non-economic and 
democracy factors that directly and indirectly affect economic 
development. The idea of Kantian-liberalism, which asserts that the 
existence of democracy reduces the increase of war and military 
expenditures in the world, necessitates the examination of the idea. 
Democracy is also important for economic development and progress and 
for the sustainability of economic stability. 
In this study, the period of 1995-2017 in 34 OECD countries, the 
relationship between military expenditures, democracy and economic 
development has been examined with the help of panel changing 
causality tests. Pesaran (2007) CADF panel root analysis was used in the 
study. When the HDI variable is examined on a cross-sectional basis, it is 
found that the unit is rootless only for Canada, Luxembourg, Czech 
Republic and England. When the first difference of HDI variable was 
taken, the test statistic was found to be greater than the critical value, ie 
the unit became rootless when the HDI difference was taken. The Milex 
variable, like the HDI variable, has become stationary in the first 
difference case while the unit value is not rooted, ie, stationary. When the 
Milex variable is examined for cross-sectional level values, only the 
Netherlands and Portugal are stationary. Democracy variable was found 
to be stationary without root and level. When this variable level value is 
examined in cross-sectional size; In Austria, England, Estonia, the 
Netherlands, Italy, Hungary and New Zealand, the unit was found to be 
rootless. Horizontal cross-sectional dependence between the series was 
investigated and the homogeneity test was determined whether the 
coefficients were homogeneous or heterogeneous, and the models 
showed heterogeneity. A time-varying panel causality test based on 
Dumitrescu-Hurlin (2012), which considers homogeneity or 
heterogeneity context, was used.      
According to the results of time-varying causality analysis, the 
relationship between military expenditures and economic development; 
Between 1995-2009, 1996-2010, 1997-2011, 1998-2012, 1999-2013, 
2000-2014, 2001-2015 periods, a two-way causality was determined, in 
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other words, military keynesian approach, which was expressed as a 
supply-side approach, from defense expenditures to economic growth. 
While it is suggested that there is a correct and positive (externality) 
relationship (Giray, 2004: 189), the causal relationship between 
development and military expenditures has disappeared in 2002-2016 
and 2003-2017 periods. In explaining the effects of defense expenditures, 
the neutrality hypothesis, which states that defense spending is not a 
positive or negative relationship with economic growth and development, 
is valid (Aytaç, 2017: 41). This situation has negative effects on 
economic development due to the fact that military expenditures in 
OECD countries have a negative effect on capital formation and decrease 
economic growth rates (Duyar, Koçoğlu, 2014: 714).     
The level of democracy, political regime forms and types of 
governance are considered as the determining factors of defense 
expenditures. When the changing causality relationship between military 
expenditures and democracy is examined, it is observed that there is a 
two-way causality between 1995-2009, 1996-2010, 1997-2011, 1998-
2012, 1999-2013, 2000-2014, 2001-2015 periods. it was determined that 
there was a one-way causality towards military expenditures, but the 
causality relationship disappeared in the 2003-2017 period. As Garfinkel 
(1994) points out, this can be explained by the change in the 
democratization level of the countries due to the fact that democratic 
countries spend less defense compared to the countries that are governed 
by other regimes (Gökbunar and Yanıkkaya, 2004: 167). 
When the relationship between development and democracy was 
examined, a unidirectional causality from development to democracy was 
determined in the periods of 1995-2009, 1996-2010, 1997-2011, 1998-
2012, 1999-2013, 2000-2014 and 2001-2015. Demirkan and Kaya 
(2012), Leblang (1997) and Acemoglu et al. (2014), a one-way causality 
from democracy to development (compability approach is valid) has been 
identified in OECD countries.   
When the relationship between military expenditures, democracy 
and economic development in OECD countries is examined by 
considering the results obtained from the study, military expenditures in 
the democracy relationship between the years 2002-2016 (1995-2009, 
1996-2010, ..., 2001-2015) There is a one-way causality relationship to 
expenditures. Despite the spread of global democracy, military 
institutions continue to exercise their administrative, judicial and 
legislative powers over citizenship (Kentor and Kick, 2008: 143; Dunne, 
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2000: 440, Kılıç et al., 2018: 137), as well as to maintain the defense 
security and stability of countries. it is not possible to give up the need 
for defense. When the relationship between development and democracy 
is taken into consideration, the transformation of the two-way causality 
relationship from the previous period ranges from democracy to 
economic development in 2002-2016 and 2003-2017 is due to the fact 
that democracy is supporting economic development in OECD countries. 
If the causality relationship in the context of military expenditure, 
democracy and economic development is interpreted for OECD 
countries, both variables have a double-sided causality in the period of 
1995-2009, 1996-2010, ..., 2001-2015, but as the democratization levels 
of these countries increase, both countries There has been an increase in 
the expenditure rate (2002-2016 period) as well as the economic 
development levels of these countries (2002-2016 and 2003-2017 
periods) due to the increase in democratization level, but the increase in 
military spending rates has increased to the level of economic 
development (2002- 2016 and 2003-2017). This situation can be 
explained that the direct effect of military expenditures on the economic 
development of OECD countries has been lost and that the increase in the 
democratization levels of these countries has led them to realize their 
economic development. 
As a policy proposal, it is seen that there is a complementary 
relationship between democracy to military expenditures and democracy 
to economic development. For this reason, OECD countries should 
accept democracy as an indispensable basic motive for sustainable 
economic development. In addition to all these statements, there is still a 
need for further research in the context of the relationship between 
democracy, military expenditures and economic development.    
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